{"id":18484,"date":"2022-06-14T15:56:33","date_gmt":"2022-06-14T13:56:33","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/herolab.usd.de\/security-advisories\/usd-2021-0010\/"},"modified":"2022-06-23T09:45:22","modified_gmt":"2022-06-23T07:45:22","slug":"usd-2021-0010","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/herolab.usd.de\/en\/security-advisories\/usd-2021-0010\/","title":{"rendered":"usd-2021-0010"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>[et_pb_section fb_built=\"1\" _builder_version=\"4.16\" _module_preset=\"default\" background_color=\"#2E353D\" custom_padding=\"||0px|||\" global_colors_info=\"{}\"][et_pb_row _builder_version=\"4.16\" _module_preset=\"default\" global_colors_info=\"{}\"][et_pb_column type=\"4_4\" _builder_version=\"4.16\" _module_preset=\"default\" global_colors_info=\"{}\"][et_pb_text _builder_version=\"4.17.4\" _module_preset=\"cc5ac6f4-ebbd-4b3f-bc92-4dfc1f15fe2c\" global_colors_info=\"{}\"]<\/p>\n<h1 id=\"details\">usd-2021-0010 | Vodafone Station<\/h1>\n<p><strong>Advisory ID<\/strong>: usd-2021-0010<br \/><strong>Product<\/strong>: Vodafone Station<br \/><strong>Affected Version<\/strong>: Firmware version: 01.02.068.11.EURO.SIP<br \/><strong>Vulnerability Type<\/strong>: Improper Access Control<br \/><strong>Security Risk<\/strong>: Medium (CVSS:3.0\/AV:A\/AC:L\/PR:N\/UI:N\/S:U\/C:L\/I:L\/A:N)<br \/><strong>Vendor URL<\/strong>: https:\/\/www.vodafone.de\/<br \/><strong>Vendor acknowledged vulnerability<\/strong>: Yes<br \/><strong>Vendor Status<\/strong>: Fixed<\/p>\n<h3 id=\"introduction\">Description<\/h3>\n<p>The <em>Vodafone Station<\/em> is a home Internet router distributed by Vodafone GmbH and manufactured by ARRIS Group, Inc. A broken access control vulnerability in the management web interface of the <em>Vodafone Station<\/em> allowed an attacker with access to the router's network to disable the Transport Layer Security (TLS) encryption used for communication between the router's web interface and a web browser without authentication. As a consequence, the management interface could not be reached using an encrypted connection anymore, forcing a legitimate user to use the unencrypted protocol. This means that data, such as user credentials, must be transferred without encryption and therefore can be intercepted within the network.<\/p>\n<h3 id=\"proofofconcept\">Proof of Concept<\/h3>\n<p>The request for disabling TLS-encrypted communication can be triggered using a simple <strong>curl<\/strong> command. To disable the TLS encryption for the router's web interface, the value <strong>HttpsEnable<\/strong> needs to be set to <strong>false<\/strong>. The request will be answered using the string \"PASS\". For a router having the IP address 192.168.0.1 the requests looks as follows:<\/p>\n<div class=\"codehilite\" style=\"background: #263238;color: #eff\">\n<pre style=\"line-height: 125%\"><span style=\"background: #263238\"><\/span><span class=\"gp\" style=\"background: #263238;color: #ffcb6b\">$ <\/span>curl <span class=\"s1\" style=\"background: #263238;color: #c3e88d\">'http:\/\/192.168.0.1\/php\/ajaxSet_settings_device_data.php?_n=12354'<\/span> --data-raw <span class=\"s1\" style=\"background: #263238;color: #c3e88d\">'{\"LedEnable\":\"false\",\"HttpsEnable\":\"false\",\"Action_Select\":\"storeDeviceData\"}'<\/span><br \/><span class=\"go\" style=\"background: #263238;color: #546e7a\">\"PASS\"<\/span><\/pre>\n<\/div>\n<h3><\/h3>\n<h3 id=\"fix\">Fix<\/h3>\n<p>It is recommended to restrict access to sensitive functions or information by default. Required access privileges should be granted explicitly by a global access control mechanism. This is already implemented for most parts of the application and was adjusted for this functionality as well.<\/p>\n<h3 id=\"timeline\">Timeline<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>2021-03-31<\/strong>: First contact request via <a href=\"https:\/\/www.vodafone.de\/unternehmen\/sicher-im-dialog.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.vodafone.de\/unternehmen\/sicher-im-dialog.html<\/a><\/li>\n<li><strong>2021-04-26<\/strong>: Second contact request via <a href=\"mailto:responsible.disclosure@vodafone.com\">responsible.disclosure@vodafone.com<\/a><\/li>\n<li><strong>2021-04-26<\/strong>: Investigation started by vendor.<\/li>\n<li><strong>2021-06-04<\/strong>: Vendor confirms vulnerability and informs us about ongoing process to \"develop, test and deploy a fix\". Further, the vendor requests to delay publication until all affected devices received a fix.<\/li>\n<li><strong>2022-01-20<\/strong>: Vendor claims: \"The deployment of a fix is ongoing and a full rollout is expected within the next two months. Approximately 50% of devices currently have the fixed firmware. This includes all of our WiFi 6 moodel devices.\"<\/li>\n<li><strong>2022-05-09<\/strong>: Status update requested.<\/li>\n<li><strong>2022-05-19<\/strong>: Vendor confirms remediation.<\/li>\n<li><strong>2022-06-14<\/strong>: This advisory is published.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"credits\">Credits<\/h3>\n<p>This security vulnerability was identified by Christian Rellmann of usd AG.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>[\/et_pb_text][\/et_pb_column][\/et_pb_row][\/et_pb_section]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>usd-2021-0010 | Vodafone Station Advisory ID: usd-2021-0010Product: Vodafone StationAffected Version: Firmware version: 01.02.068.11.EURO.SIPVulnerability Type: Improper Access ControlSecurity Risk: Medium (CVSS:3.0\/AV:A\/AC:L\/PR:N\/UI:N\/S:U\/C:L\/I:L\/A:N)Vendor URL: https:\/\/www.vodafone.de\/Vendor acknowledged vulnerability: YesVendor Status: Fixed Description The Vodafone Station is a home Internet router distributed by Vodafone GmbH and manufactured by ARRIS Group, Inc. A broken access control vulnerability in the management web [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":109,"featured_media":0,"parent":16124,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"_et_pb_use_builder":"on","_et_pb_old_content":"","_et_gb_content_width":"","inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-18484","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/herolab.usd.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/18484","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/herolab.usd.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/herolab.usd.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/herolab.usd.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/109"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/herolab.usd.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=18484"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/herolab.usd.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/18484\/revisions"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/herolab.usd.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/16124"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/herolab.usd.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=18484"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}